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Abstract
This essay aims to provide a modal logic for rational intuition. Simi-
larly to treatments of the property of knowledge in epistemic logic, I ar-
gue that rational intuition can be codified by a modal operator governed
by the axioms of a dynamic provability logic, which augments GL with
the modal µ-calculus. Via correspondence results between modal logic
and first-order logic, a precise translation can then be provided between
the notion of ’intuition-of’, i.e., the cognitive phenomenal properties of
thoughts, and the modal operators regimenting the notion of ’intuition-
that’. I argue that intuition-that can further be shown to entrain concep-
tual elucidation, by way of figuring as a dynamic-interpretational modality
which induces the reinterpretation of both domains of quantification and
the intensions of mathematical concepts that are formalizable in monadic
first- and second-order formal languages.
1 Introduction
’The incompleteness results do not rule out the possibility that there is a
theorem-proving computer which is in fact equivalent to mathematical
intuition’ – Gödel, quoted in Wang (1986: 186).1
Gödel’s writings on the epistemology of mathematics number fewer than
twenty pages. He avails, in his remarks, of a notion of non-sensory intuition
– alternatively, ’consciousness’, or ’phenomenology’ (cf. Gödel, 1961: 383) –
as a fundamental, epistemic conduit into mathematical truths.2 According to
1Note however that, in the next subsequent sentence, Gödel records scepticism about the
foregoing. He remarks: ’But they imply that, in such a – highly unlikely for other reasons –
case, either we do not know the exact specification of the computer or we do not know that
it works correctly’ [Gödel, quoted in Wang (op. cit.)].
2Another topic that Gödel suggests as being of epistemological significance is the notion of
’formalism freeness’, according to which the concepts of computability, demonstrability (i.e.,
absolute provability), and ordinal definability can be specified independently of a background
formal language (cf. Gödel 1946, and Kennedy 2013 for further discussion). Kennedy notes
however that, in his characterizations of demonstrability and definability, Gödel assumes ZFC
as his metatheory (op. cit.: 383). Further examination of the foregoing is beyond the scope
of the present essay.
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Gödel, the defining properties of mathematical intuition include (i) that it either
is, or is analogous to, a type of perception (1951: 323; 1953,V: 359; 1964: 268);
(ii) that it enables subjects to alight upon new axioms which are possibly true
(1953,III: 353,fn.43; 1953,V: 361; 1961: 383, 385; 1964: 268); (iii) that it is
associated with modal properties, such as provability and necessity (1933: 301;
1964: 261); and (iv) that the non-sensory intuition of abstracta such as concepts
entrains greater conceptual ’clarification’ (1953,III: 353,fn.43; 1961: 383). Such
intuitions are purported to be both of abstracta and formulas, as well as to the
effect that the formulas are true.3
In this paper, I aim to outline the logical foundations for rational intuition,
by examining the nature of property (iii). The primary objection to Gödel’s ap-
proach to mathematical knowledge is that the very idea of rational intuition is
insufficiently constrained.4 Subsequent research has thus endeavored to expand
upon the notion, and to elaborate on intuition’s roles. Chudnoff (2013) suggests,
e.g., that intuitions are non-sensory experiences which represent non-sensory en-
tities, and that the justificatory role of intuition is that it enables subjects to
be aware of the truth-makers for propositions (p. 3; ch. 7). He argues, further,
that intuitions both provide evidence for beliefs as well as serve to guide actions
(145).5 Bengson (2015: 718-723) suggests that rational intuition can be iden-
tified with the ’presentational’, i.e., phenomenal, properties of representational
3The distinction between ’intuition-of’ and ’intuition-that’ is explicitly delineated in Par-
sons (1980: 145-146), and will be further discussed in Section 2.
4See, e.g., Hale and Wright (2002). Wright (2004) provides a vivid articulation of the issue:
’A major — but not the only – problem is that, venerable as the tradition of postulating
intuitive knowledge of first principles may be, no-one working within it has succeeded at
producing even a moderately plausible account of how the claimed faculty of rational intuition
is supposed to work — how exactly it might be constituted so as to be reliably responsive to
basic logical validity as, under normal circumstances, vision, say, is reliably responsive to the
configuration of middle-sized objects in the nearby environment of a normal human perceiver’
(op. cit.: 158).
5A similar proposal concerning the justificatory import of cognitive phenomenology – i.e.,
the properties of consciousness unique to non-sensory mental states such as belief – can be
found in Smithies (2013a,b). Smithies prescinds, however, from generalizing his approach to
the epistemology of mathematics.
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mental states – namely, cognitions – where the phenomenal properties at issue
are similarly non-sensory; are not the product of a subject’s mental acts, and
so are ’non-voluntary’; are qualitatively gradational; and they both ’dispose or
incline assent to their contents’ and further ’rationalize’ assent thereof.6
Rather than target objections to the foregoing essays, the present discussion
aims to rebut the primary objection to mathematical intuition alluded to above,
by providing a logic for its defining properties. The significance of the proposal
is thus that it will make the notion of intuition formally tractable, and might
thus serve to redress the contention that the notion is mysterious and ad hoc.
In his (1933) and (1964), Gödel suggests that intuition has a constitutively
modal profile. Constructive intuitionistic logic is shown to be translatable into
the modal logic, S4, with the rule of necessitation, while the modal operator is
interpreted as concerning provability.7 Mathematical intuition of set-theoretic
axioms is, further, purported both to entrain ’intrinsic’ justification, and to
illuminate the ’intrinsic necessity’ thereof.8 Following Gödel’s line of thought, I
aim, in this paper, to provide a modal logic for the notion of ’intuition-that’.9
6Compare Kriegel (2015: 68), who stipulates that ’making a judgment that p involves a
feeling of involuntariness’ and ’making a judgment always involves the feeling of mobilizing a
concept’.
7For further discussion both of provability logic and of intuitionistic systems of modal logic,
see Löb (1955); Smiley (1963); Kripke (1965); and Boolos (1993). Löb’s provability formula
was formulated in response to Henkin’s (1952) problem concerning whether a sentence which
ascribes the property of being provable to itself is provable. (Cf. Halbach and Visser, 2014,
for further discussion.) For an anticipation of the provability formula, see Wittgenstein (1933-
1937/2005: 378), where Wittgenstein writes: ’If we prove that a problem can be solved, the
concept ’solution’ must somehow occur in the proof. (There must be something in the mech-
anism of the proof that corresponds to this concept.) But the concept mustn’t be represented
by an external description; it must really be demonstrated. / The proof of the provability of
a proposition is the proof of the proposition itself’ (op. cit.). Wittgenstein distinguishes the
foregoing type of proof with ’proofs of relevance’ which are akin to the mathematical, rather
than empirical, propositions, discussed in Wittgenstein (2001: IV, 4-13, 30-31).
8Gödel (1964) does not define intrinsic justifications, although he does contrast the lat-
ter with the notion of extrinsic justifications, for which he provides a few defining remarks.
Extrinsic justifications are associated, for example, with both the evidential probability of
propositions, and the ’fruitful’ consequences of a mathematical theory subsequent to adopting
new axioms. See Gödel (op. cit.: 269).
9Cf. Parsons (1979-1980; 1983: p. 25, chs.10-11; 2008: 176).
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If rational intuition is identical with cognitive phenomenal properties of
representational states such as beliefs and judgments, then – via correspon-
dence results between modal logic and first-order logic [cf. van Benthem (1983;
1984/2003)] – a precise translation can be provided between the notion of
’intuition-of’, i.e., the cognitive phenomenal properties of thoughts whose con-
tents can concern the axioms of mathematical languages, and the modal oper-
ators regimenting the notion of ’intuition-that’.10 I argue, then, that intuition-
that can further be shown to entrain property (iv), i.e. conceptual elucidation,
by way of figuring as an interpretational modality which induces the reinterpre-
tation of domains of quantification (cf. Fine, 2005; 2006). Fine (op. cit.) has
suggested that the interpretational modality is imperatival, and that the deon-
tic aspects of the modality might best be captured by a dynamic logic (p.c.).
Following Fine’s suggestion, I argue that intuition-that can thus be understood
to be a species of fixed point dynamic provability logic, which is equivalent to
the bisimulation-invariant fragment of monadic second-order logic (cf. Janin
and Walukiewicz, 1996; Venema, 2014, ms). Modalized rational intuition is
therefore expressively equivalent to – and can crucially serve as a guide to the
interpretation of – the entities, such as mathematical concepts, that are formal-
izable in monadic first- and second-order formal languages.
In Section 2, I elucidate the properties of rational intuition, by examining
arguments and evidence adducing in favor of the existence of cognitive phenom-
enal consciousness. In Section 3, I countenance and motivate a multi-modal
logic, which augments the provability logic, GL, with fixed point dynamic logic,
i.e. the modal µ-calculus. I argue that the dynamic properties of modalized ra-
tional intuition provide a precise means of accounting for the manner by which
10This provides a precise answer to the target inquiry advanced by Parsons (1993: 233).
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intuition can yield the reinterpretation of quantifier domains and mathematical
vocabulary; and thus explain the role of rational intuition in entraining concep-
tual elucidation. In Section 4, I examine remaining objections to the viability
of rational intuition and provide concluding remarks.
2 Rational Intuition as Cognitive Phenomenol-
ogy
A property of a mental state is phenomenal only if it is the property of being
aware of the state. If the mental state at issue is sensory, then sensory phenom-
enal properties will be properties of being aware of one’s perceptions, where the
perceptions at issue will be unique to the subject’s sensory modalities of vision,
audition, etc.11 Let cognitive phenomenal consciousness refer to the properties
of being aware of the non-sensory representational mental states toward which
subjects can bear attitudes. Such states can be identified with, e.g., formulas,
φ, in a Language of Thought,12 the syntax for which mirrors that of natural lan-
guage sentences, and which can fall within the scope of various operators such
as fully or partially believing that (x, x a propositional variable/φ), knowing
that (x/φ), judging that (x/φ), asserting that (x/φ), questioning whether (x/φ)
has a particular semantic value, et al.
Pitt (2004: 8) provides the following argument for the existence of cognitive
phenomenal properties, which – for the purposes of this essay – I will assume
11For issues concerning the taxonomy of the sense modalities, see Macpherson (2011).
Bottom-up/exogenous, spatial-based, property-based, and diffuse/focal attention arguably
comprise a necessary condition on the instantiation of phenomenal properties. The condition
is witnessed by the phenomenon referred to as the attentional blink. The attentional blink
holds if and only if shifting attentional allocation from one stimulus to another induces a lack
of awareness of the first stimulus to which attention was previously distributed. See Author
(ms) and the essays in Mole et al. (eds.) (2010), for further discussion.
12Cf. Fodor (1975).
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to be sound:
(K1) ’It is possible immediately to identify one’s occurrent conscious thoughts
(equivalently (see below): one can know by acquaintance which thought a par-
ticular occurrent conscious thought is); but
(K2) It would not be possible immediately to identify one’s conscious thoughts
unless each type of conscious thought had a proprietary, distinctive, individua-
tive phenomenology; so
(P) Each type of conscious thought – each state of consciously thinking that
p, for all thinkable contents p – has a proprietary, distinctive, individuative
phenomenology’.
In his examination of the conditions on measuring partial beliefs, i.e., sub-
jective probability, Ramsey (1926) records scepticism about whether subjects
are aware in a non-sensory way of all of their (partial) beliefs.13 For the pur-
poses of this note, it is sufficient that at least some cognitive states are states
of which subjects can be aware – where, again, the properties of awareness at
issue are non-sensory and purported to be unique to distinct cognitive attitudes,
such that being aware of one’s belief that φ will qualitatively differ from one’s
awareness of one’s interrogative state concerning whether φ is true.
The evidence for the claim that at least some cognitive states are associated
with a unique set of non-sensory properties of awareness has proceeded via in-
13See Ramsey (op. cit.: 169): ’Suppose that the degree of a belief is something perceptible
by its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling by which they are
accompanied, which might be called a belief-feeling or feeling of conviction, and that by the
degree of belief we mean the intensity of this feeling. This view would be very inconvenient,
for it is not easy to ascribe numbers to the intensities of feelings; but apart from this it seems
to me observably false, for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are often accompanied by
practically no feeling at all; no one feels strongly about things he takes for granted’. Contrast
Koopman (1940: 271), who argues that intuition can serve as a guide to veridical judgments
concerning the comparison of probability measures [cf. de Finetti (1937/1964: ch.1) on the
primacy of comparative judgments of probability], as well as to the axioms – or laws of
consistency – of a probability theory.
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trospective reports.14 In the latter, subjects verbally report upon the valence
of their awareness of their states, where their reports are assumed to be reli-
able.15 One phenomenon of awareness of one’s thoughts might, e.g., be that
of inner speech.16 It is an open issue whether inner speech has a sensory basis
(cf. Prinz, 2012). If not, however, and assuming that introspective report is
a reliable method for discerning whether subjects are aware of their states –
irrespective of their being able to ascertain a precise value thereof – then there
might be properties of awareness that are unique to one’s thoughts and cognitive
propositional attitudes.17
3 Modalized Rational Intuition and Conceptual
Elucidation
In this section, I will outline the logic for Gödelian intuition. The motivation for
providing a logic for rational intuition will perhaps be familiar from treatments
of the property of knowledge in formal epistemology. The analogy between
rational intuition and the property of knowledge is striking: Just as knowledge
has been argued to be a mental state (Williamson, 2001; Nagel, 2013b); to
14The results of the method of introspection are availed of by Pitt (op. cit.), and discussed in
the essays in Bayne and Montague (eds.) (2011). For an excellent survey of the experimental
paradigms endeavoring to corroborate that intuition can be a source of evidence, see Nagel
(2007; 2013a).
15See, however, Schwitzgebel (2011) for an examination of a series of case studies evincing
that introspective report is unreliable as a method for measuring consciousness.
16Cf. Carruthers (1996). Assuming the reliability of introspection, Machery (2005) argues
that awareness of one’s thoughts is nevertheless insufficient for ascertaining the syntactic
structure thereof.
17Nagel (2013) examines an approach to intuitions which construes the latter as a type
of cognition, rather than as a phenomenal property of judgments. She distinguishes, e.g.,
between intuition and reflection, on the basis of experimental results which corroborate that
there are distinct types of cognitive processing (op. cit.: 226-228). Intuitive and reflective
cognitive processing are argued to interact differently with the phenomenal information com-
prising subjects’ working memory stores. Nagel notes that – by contrast to intuitive cognition
– reflective cognition ’requires the sequential use of a progression of conscious contents to
generate an attitude, as in deliberation’ (231).
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be propositional (Stanley and Williamson, 2001); to be factive; and to possess
modal properties (Hintikka, 1962; Nozick, 1981; Fagin et al., 1995; Meyer and
van der Hoek, 1995), so rational intuition can be argued to be a property of
mental states; to be propositional, as recorded by the notion of intuition-that;
and to possess modal properties amenable to rigorous treatment in systems of
modal logic.
I should like to suggest that the modal logic of Gödelian intuition is the
bimodal logic combining GL – which is comprised of axioms K, 4, GL, and the
rule of necessitation – with the modal µ-calculus.
Let M be a model over the Kripke frame, 〈W, R〉; so, M = 〈W, R, V〉. W is
a non-empty set of possible worlds. R is a binary relation on W. V is a function
assigning proposition letters, φ, to subsets of W.
〈M,w〉  φ if and only if w∈V(φ).
〈M,w〉  ¬φ iff it is not the case that 〈M,w〉  φ
〈M,w〉  φ ∧ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ and 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ∨ ψ iff 〈M,w〉  φ or 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ → ψ iff, if 〈M,w〉  φ, then 〈M,w〉  ψ
〈M,w〉  φ ⇐⇒ ψ iff [〈M,w〉  φ iff 〈M,w〉  ψ]
〈M,w〉  ⋄φ iff ∃w’[R(w,w’) and 〈M,w’〉  φ]
〈M,w〉  φ iff ∀w’[If R(w,w’), then 〈M,w’〉  φ].
K states that (φ→ψ) → (φ→ψ); i.e., if one has an intuition that φ
entails ψ, then if one has the intuition that φ then one has the intuition that
ψ. GL states that [(φ → φ) → φ]; i.e., if one has the intuition that the
intuition that φ entails that φ is true, then one has the intuition that φ. 4
states that φ → φ; i.e., if one has the intuition that φ, then one intuits
that one has the intuition that φ. Necessitation states that ⊢φ→ ⊢φ. Because
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intuition-that is non-factive, we eschew in our modal system of axiom T, which
states that φ → φ; i.e., one has the intuition that φ only if φ is the case [cf.
BonJour (1998: 4.4); Parsons (2008: 141)].
In order to account for the role of rational intuition in entraining concep-
tual elucidation (cf., Gödel, 1961: 383), I propose to follow Fine (2006) and
Uzquiano (2015) in suggesting that there are interpretational modalities associ-
ated with the possibility of reinterpreting both domains of quantification (Fine,
op. cit.) and the non-logical vocabulary of mathematical languages, such as the
membership relation in ZF set theory (Uzquiano, op. cit.).18
Fine (2005) has taken the interpretational modality to be imperatival, and
has suggested that a dynamic logic might be an optimal means of formalizing
the imperative to reinterpret quantifier domains. He (op. cit.) suggests, fur-
ther, that the interpretational modality might be characterized as a program,
whose operations can take the form of ’simple’ and ’complex’ postulates which
enjoin subjects to reinterpret the domains. Uzquiano’s (op. cit.) generalization
of the interpretational modality, in order to target the reinterpretation of the
extensions of terms such as the membership relation, can similarly be treated.
In propositional dynamic logic (PDL), there are an infinite number of di-
amonds, with the form 〈pi〉.19 pi denotes a non-deterministic program, which
in the present setting will correspond to Fine’s postulates adumbrated in the
foregoing. 〈pi〉φ abbreviates ’some execution of pi from the present state entrains
a state bearing information φ’. The dual operator is [pi]φ, which abbreviates ’all
18A variant strategy is pursued by Eagle (2008). Eagle suggests that the relation between
rational intuition and conceptual elucidation might be witnessed via associating the fundamen-
tal properties of the entities at issue with their Ramsey sentences; i.e., existentially generalized
formulas, where the theoretical terms therein are replaced by second-order variables bound
by the quantifiers. However, the proposal would have to be expanded upon, if it were to
accommodate Gödel’s claim that mathematical intuitions possess a modal profile.
19Cf. Blackburn et al., op. cit.: 12-14. A semantics and proof-theory for PDL are outlined
in Hoare (1969); Pratt (1976); Goldblatt (1987: ch. 10; 1993: ch. 7) and van Benthem (2010:
158).
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executions of pi from the present state entrain a state bearing information φ’.
pi* is a program that executes a distinct program, pi, a number of times ≥ 0.
This is known as the iteration principle. PDL is similarly closed under finite and
infinite unions. This is referred to as the ’choice’ principle: If pi1 and pi2 are pro-
grams, then so is pi1 ∪ pi2. The forth condition is codified by the ’composition’
principle: If pi1 and pi2 are programs, then pi1;pi2 is a program (intuitively: the
composed program first executes pi1 then pi2). The back condition is codified by
Segerberg’s induction axiom (Blackburn et al., op. cit: p. 13): All executions
of pi* (at t) entrain the following conditional state: If it is the case that (i) if φ,
then all the executions of pi (at t) yield φ; then (ii) if φ, then all executions of
pi* (at t) yield φ. Formally, [pi*](φ → [pi]φ) → (φ → [pi*]φ).
We augment, then, the provability logic for Gödelian intuition with the ax-
iom, φ → [pi]φ, in order to yield a bimodal, dynamic provability logic thereof.
Crucially, the iteration principle permits pi* to be interpreted as a fixed point
for the equation: x ⇐⇒ φ ∨ ⋄x. The smallest solution to the equation will be
the least fixed point, µx.φ ∨ ⋄x, while the largest solution to the equation, when
pi* ∨∞⋄, will be the greatest fixed point, vx.φ ∨ ⋄x. Janin and Walukiewicz (op.
cit.) have proven that the modal µ-calculus is equivalent to the bisimulation-
invariant fragment of second-order logic.
Fine’s simple dynamic-postulational modality takes, then, the form:
’(i) Introduction. !x.C(x)’, which states the imperative to: ’[I]ntroduce an
object x [to the domain] conforming to the condition C(x)’.
Fine’s complex dynamic-postulational modalities are the following:
(ii) ’Composition. Where β and γ are postulates, then so is β;γ. We may read
β;γ as: do β and then do γ; and β;γ is to be executed by first executing β and
then executing γ.
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(iii) Conditional. Where β is a postulate and A an indicative sentence, then A
→ β is a postulate. We may read A → β as: if A then do β. How A → β is
executed depends upon whether or not A is true: if A is true, A → β is
executed by executing β; if A is false, then A → β is executed by doing
nothing.
(iv) Universal. Where β(x) is a postulate, then so is ∀xβ(x). We may read
∀xβ(x) as: do β(x) for each x; and ∀xβ(x) is executed by simultaneously
executing each of β(x1), β(x2), β(x3), . . . , where x1, x2, x3, . . . are the values
of x (within the current domain). Similarly for the postulate ∀Fβ(F), where F
is a second-order variable.
(v) Iterative Postulates. Where β is a postulate, then so is β*. We may read
β* as: iterate β; and β* is executed by executing β, then executing β again,
and so on ad infinitum’ (op. cit.: 91-92).
Whereas Fine avails of the foregoing interpretational modalities in order both
to account for the notion of indefinite extensiblity and to demonstrate how un-
restricted quantification can be innocuous without foundering upon Russell’s
paradox (op. cit.: 26-30), the primary interest in adopting modal µ provability
logic as the logic of rational intuition is its capacity to account for reinterpreta-
tions of mathematical vocabulary and quantifier domains; and thus to illuminate
how the precise mechanisms codifying modalized rational intuition might be able
to entrain advances in conceptual elucidation.
Finally, the computational profile of modalized rational intuition can be
outlined as follows. In category theory, a category C is comprised of a class
Ob(C) of objects a family of arrows for each pair of objects C(A,B) (Venema,
2007: 421). An E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred
to as the carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the
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transition map of A (390). A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can
be thus defined (391). An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A, aI , C, δ, F〉, such that
A is the state space of the automaton A; aI∈A is the automaton’s initial state;
C is the coding for the automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties
of the natural numbers; δ: A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆ A
is the collection of admissible states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such that F:
A → 1 if a∈F and A → 0 if a/∈F (op. cit.). The modal profile of coalgebraic
automata can be witnessed both by construing the transition function as a
counterfactual conditional (cf. Stalnaker, 1968; Williamson, 2007), and in virtue
of the convergence of coalgebraic categories of automata with coalgebraic models
of modal logic (407). Let
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, such that S,s  ∇Φ if
and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)] (op. cit.). A is
then the category of modal coalgebraic automata.
The philosophical significance of the foregoing is that the modal logic of
rational intuition can be interpretable in the category of modal coalgebraic
automata. The foregoing accounts for the distinctively computational nature of
the modal profile of rational intuition.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note, I have endeavored to outline the modal logic of Gödel’s conception
of intuition, in order both (i) to provide a formally tractable foundation thereof,
and thus (ii) to answer the primary objection to the notion as a viable approach
to the epistemology of mathematics. I have been less concerned with providing
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a defense of the general approach from the array of objections that have been
proffered in the literature. Rather, I have sought to demonstrate how the mech-
anisms of rational intuition can be formally codified and thereby placed on a
secure basis.
Among, e.g., the most notable remaining objections, Koellner (2009) has
argued that the best candidates for satisfying Gödel’s conditions on being in-
trinsically justified are reflection principles, which state that the height of the
hierarchy of sets, V, cannot be constructed ’from below’, because, for all true
formulas in V, the formulas will be true in a proper initial segment of the
hierarchy. Koellner’s limitative results are, then, to the effect that reflection
principles cannot exceed second-order universal quantification without entrain-
ing inconsistency (op. cit.).20 Another crucial objection is that the properties
of rational intuition, as a species of cognitive phenomenology, lack clear and
principled criteria of individuation. Burgess (2014) notes, e.g., that the role
of rational intuition in alighting upon mathematical truths might be distinct
from the functions belonging to what he terms a ’heuristic’ type of intuition.
The constitutive role of the latter might be to guide a mathematician’s non-
algorithmic insight as she pursues an informal proof. A similar objection is
advanced in Cappelen (2012: 3.2-3.3), who argues that – by contrast to the
properties picked out by theoretical terms such as ’utility function’ – terms pur-
porting to designate cognitive phenomenal properties both lack paradigmatic
criteria of individuation and must thereby be a topic of disagreement, in virtue
of the breadth of variation in the roles that the notion has been intended to
satisfy.
20The issue of accounting for third-order variables in order to state, e.g., Cantor’s Theorem
and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis might yet be redressed, if one were to follow
Shapiro (1991: 103-105), and avail of second-order paraphrases for formulas which concern
sets and sequences of sets.
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The foregoing issues notwithstanding, I have endeavored to demonstrate that
– as with the property of knowledge – an approach to the notion of intuition-that
which construes the notion as a modal operator, and the provision thereof with a
philosophically defensible logic, might be sufficient to counter the objection that
the very idea of rational intuition is mysterious and constitutively unconstrained.
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